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Until just a year ago, hardly anyone believed that the increasingly unrestrained growth in 
mobility could be so abruptly interrupted by a radical immobilisation of large population 






affected immigration to the country.
Due  to  complexity  reasons,  we  focus  exclusively  on  the  situation  of  asylum  seekers, 
giving additional attention to unaccompanied minors. These groups’ migration status 
is  assumed  to make  them  especially  susceptible  to  the  newly  established  immigration 
measures. Drawing upon a combined focus of data on migration regulations and asylum 
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Steadily growing numbers of commuters, business and vacation travellers have 
determined the forecasts, debates and scientific analyses of recent decades. And 
it was believed that mobility not only would, but also should continue to grow. 
More students should be able to study at foreign universities, workers should be 
able to move with fewer restrictions through international economic areas ac­
cording to labour market demands and it should be possible for individuals to 
take vacations, parties or family reunions wherever they want, even if these plac­
es are increasingly scattered around the globe. Three main reasons are given for 
the growth in mobility:
“International mobility has become easier since the 1980s because of political 
reform, cheaper transport and a communication revolution that has opened up 
access to information, ideas and networks hitherto the prerogative of the few” 
[2, p. 7].
Parallel to increases over the last decades in these forms of mobility or mi­
gration, which are mostly seen as positive and functional, mobility and migration 
due to poverty, war, political persecution or climate change have also been rising 
[3; 4]1. One recent peak in this latter form of migration was the so-called “mi­
gration crisis” of 2015/2016, in which more than one million migrants knocked 
on Europe’s doors within a short period of time to gain entry, protection and a 
perspective in life. However, COVID­19 and the fears and perceived threats as­
sociated with the virus and its aftereffects led to mobility restrictions for a wide 
majority of the population with a scope and intensity that were unprecedented in 
post­war Europe [5—7].
“Many people stopped going out to work (unless deemed essential) while oth­
ers were sent back to rural villages or distant countries; children were kept home 
from school and struggled to learn online; many businesses closed their doors 
while  others  had  to  reorganize  their work  processes;  airplanes  stopped flying, 
airports emptied, and cruise ships were turned away from ports as borders closed; 
factories stopped churning out inessential products, and the global shipment of 
goods slowed to a trickle.” [6, p. 1].
COVID­19 posed a new unforeseen and unfamiliar challenge that caused 
formidable  insecurities  among  people  and  governments  “that  confront  deci­
sion­makers and undermine assumptions of security, including the security goals 
that were defined by the UN.” [8, p. 406].
In  this context, which was classified as a state of emergency, governments 
quickly implemented mobility and migration regulations so that by mid­April 
restrictions were in place at the sub­ and supranational levels which were more 
comprehensively and globally encompassing than any time before this in his­
1 INFORM # 1 — EU and OECD member states responses to managing residence permits 
and migrant unemployment during the COVID­19 pandemic, 2020, European Migration 
Network, European Commission, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home­affairs/sites/home­
affairs/files/oo_eu_inform1_residence_permits_and_unemployment_en_updated_final.pdf 
(accessed 25.04.2020).
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ed or in many cases suspended3 short or long term [13, p. 1237; 11]. This for 
example led to a significant decrease in arrivals to Europe in the Mediterranean 
region. While in January 2020 8,223 and February 6,732 arrivals were counted 
the numbers dropped to 3,686 in March and to just 1,658 arrivals in April [11, 
xxiv]. One year before, in April 2019, 5,675 migrants arrived in Europe via the 
Mediterranean migration channels [11 p. xxiv]. In addition, within the frame­
work of COVID­19 measures, service provision measures for migrants — de­
pending on the respective national, regional or local conditions — were more 
or less drastically changed, adapted to the new situation or suspended [13, 
p. 1238]. Many countries, such as Norway, made drastic legislative changes, 
giving governments the mandate to make decisions, also without broader par­
liamentary consultation, which would temporarily suspend or change the ex­
isting legal framework for national borders for the duration of the COVID­19 
crisis COVID­194.
If the reports, documents, minutes and decisions that formed the basis of 
COVID­related political decisions become available at all in the future, then only 
after a longer period of time, as in the case of Norway, where such information 
might be held back for 60 years in accordance with provisions in the Administra­
tion, Personal Information and Security Act [14].
Although substantial measures were implemented against this perceived threat 
and challenges  it  is  argued  that  “countries  could have been better  prepared  and 
taken early measures to contain the spread of COVID­19” [15, p. 379]. Especially, 
when the threat of a pandemic rose on the horizon, supra­, national and sub­national 
policies reacted — under the lack of a coherent international policy — almost idio­
syncratic to the perceived COVID­19 challenges. Many countries shifted from the 
policies managing the COVID­19 threat in a purely health perspective to a mobil­
ity and/or migration perspective. “While the COVID-19 pandemic is not a migra­
tion issues it is being viewed and managed as one” [16]. Additionally, some coun­
try-specific debates and policies tried to instrumentalise and utilise the COVID-19 
pandemic for introducing or pushing anti­migration arguments and measures [16].
This paper discusses the changes in the Norwegian institutional framework 
for immigration in reaction to COVID­19 and the consequences these changes 
2 COVID­19 emergency measures in asylum and reception systems, 2020, EASO, Bruessels, 




4 Ny koronalov, 2020, Regjeringen.no, available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/ny­
koronalov/id2694038/ (accessed 25.04.2020).
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COVID­19 on the EU level, since this was a factor framing political decisions in 
Norway. Next, we will examine how policy in Norway reacted to the perceived 
challenges of COVID­19 and how this changed the conditions affecting immi­
gration, cross­border and internal migration and mobility. In a third step, we will 
examine how immigration to Norway — with a special focus on asylum­related 
migration — has developed since COVID­19 spread to Europe. The article con­
cludes with a further discussion of the contents of the paper.
First Reactions of the EU to the COVID-19 Threat
Before we discuss the concrete developments and measures in Norway, it 
is important to take a closer look at the developments at the European level 
since February 2020, which have influenced mobility and migration-specific 
restrictions, not just at the European, but also at the national, regional and 
local levels.
First, we will summarise how this situation began. The virus was first discov­
ered in Europe in February 2020 in Italy, which immediately declared a state of 
emergency. From the end of February onwards, the EU introduced various public 
health, economic, agri­food and travel measures to contain the consequences of 
Covid­19 within the European states5. On 17 March the European Commission 
established an international advisory panel of “leading epidemiologists and virol­
ogists” from different EU Member States.
The perceived threat of COVID­19 had lasting consequences for asylum­re­
lated migration and the associated asylum and repatriation procedures6.
It quickly became clear that asylum procedures and processes, as well as the 
resettlement and repatriation of migrants in general and refugees had to be adapt­
ed to the new situation with regard to COVID­197. For asylum registration and 
housing, this meant altering the interviewing procedures as well as the reception 
5 Summary of the European Commission’s response to сoronavirus (COVID­19) crisis to date, 
2020, European  Commission, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/ireland/news/summary­of­
the­european­commission­s­response­to­corona­virus­covid­19­crisis­to­date_en (accessed 
25.04.2020).
6 COVID­19: Guidance on the implementation of relevant EU provisions in the area of asylum 
and return procedures and on resettlement, 2020, European Commission, p. 1, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/guidance­implementation­eu­provisions­asylum­re­
tur­procedures­resettlement.pdf (accessed 25.04.2020).
7 ibid. P. 2
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conditions (including detention and asylum procedures)8. This posed a significant 
strain on the EU regarding the variable contexts of implementation among the 
EU member  states  and  associated EEA  countries.  “The Commission  fully  ac­
knowledges the difficulties that in the current context Member States face when 
implementing relevant EU rules in this regard”9.
In principle the EU, although acknowledging the complexities of COVID­19 
challenges, aimed  to maintain  the usual processes and procedures. “Therefore, 
even if there are delays, third­country nationals who apply for international pro­
tection must have their application registered by the authorities and be able to 
lodge them.”10 However, with the rise of COVID­19, measures were also imple­
mented to allow for some flexibility  in asylum procedures. “As regards recep­
tion conditions, Member States may make use of the possibility under Directive 
2013/33/EU (hereafter ‘the Reception Conditions Directive’) to exceptionally 
set, in duly justified cases and for a reasonable period that should be as short as 
possible, different modalities for material reception conditions from those nor­
mally required”11.
For example, it was proposed, in accordance with Article 31 (3) of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive, that the periods for the examination of asylum applications 
be made more flexible. In this context, several recommendations were made to 
sustain adequate asylum procedures and processes despite the new constraints. 
It was proposed  to  the Member States  that  they practice “social” or  “physical 
distancing” by replacing their face­to­face interaction with media or digital com­
munication via phone, mobile or web­based electronic services12. As for asylum 
procedures, this meant that personal interviews were to be suspended for a certain 
period or conducted per video conference.
The Commission further recommended, “that Member States as far as possi­
ble make use of such specific temporary arrangements, provided that necessary 
arrangements concerning the facilities are set up and that interpretation, as well 
as access to legal assistance and representation, is ensured by the competent au­
thorities”13.
From these statements alone, it can be seen that from the first appearance of 
the virus in Europe, especially in January and February, the EU’s way of dealing 
8 ibid. P. 2
9 ibid. P. 1
10 EASO Guidance on asylum procedure: operational standards and indicators, 2020, EASO, 
Bruessels, p. 3, available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/covid19­emergen­
cy­measures­asylum­reception­systems.pdf (accessed 25.04.2020).
11 ibid. P. 3.
12 ibid. P. 4.
13 ibid. Р. 5.
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with COVID-19 had a substantial influence on the temporal as well as substan­
tive rules regarding mobility processes, especially with regard to asylum. Asylum 
process procedures in the partner countries began to be delayed — for example, 
owing to the change from face­to­face interaction to digital communication and 
digital processing of cases. Defined deadlines — e. g. “six months for conclud­
ing the examination of an application”14 or procedures under Regulation (EU) 
№ 604/2013 — as well as associated procedures, had to be divided into parts and 
in some aspects decelerated, which meant longer processing and waiting times as 
well as a delayed onward journey for asylum seekers to other destination coun­
tries within the Euro­Zone — e. g. in the context of Dublin Transfers15.
The same lasting effects that COVID­19 had on asylum applicants’ mo­
bility  could  be  observed with  regard  to  their  “immobility”,  i. e.  the  condi­
tions where they were staying in reception or temporary camps or in their 
borderlands. Almost overnight common procedures such as health screening, 
health care, quarantine and isolation16 had to be adapted to the requirements 
associated  with  the  perceived  COVID-19  problem.  “Many Member  States 
have introduced stricter medical screening for applicants and mandatory 
COVID­19 testing for new arrivals”17. In addition to typical health care is­
sues like emergency care and treatment of illnesses and mental disorders, 
now member states had to implement new measures dealing with COVID­19 
health issues under higher risk situations, for instance, because they had to be 
conducted face­to­face18.
This was complicated by the different rates, at which national or regional gov­
ernments implemented such measures. Not only did the countries follow different 
assessments and decisions regarding the timing of the implementation of relevant 
measures.19 The measures themselves were different in character and their impli­
14 “Article 31 (3) point (b) of the Asylum Procedures Directive allows Member States to extend 
the six­month period for concluding the examination of applications by a period not exceeding a 
further nine months when a large number of third country nationals or stateless persons simultane­
ously apply for international protection, making it very difficult to complete the examination with­
in this time­limit.”(EASO Guidance on asylum procedure: operational standards and indicators, 
2020, EASO, Bruessels, p. 7, available at: https://easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Guidance_on_
asylum_procedure_operational_standards_and_indicators_EN.pdf (accessed 25.04.2020)).





18 ibid. Р. 10.
19 ibid. Р. 7.
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cations for mobile and non­mobile people20. Hence, actions or mobility practices 
that were appropriate in one national or specific regional context, may not have 
been appropriate in another one.
Norway’s Responses to the COVID-19 Threat  
in the Context of Migration
Norway started to introduce emergency measures in mid­March 202021. 
However, already on 31 January, in response to the development of COVID­19 
in Asia, the Ministry of Health and Care Services commissioned the Norwe­
gian Directorate  of Health  to  “coordinate  the health  and  care  sectors’  efforts 
in collaboration with the National Institute of Public Health and other affected 
actors”22. On 31 January COVID­19 was also categorised as a highly infectious 
and generally dangerous disease and it became a requirement to report all cas­
es. In the following weeks and months, the Norwegian government introduced 
further measures to control COVID­19 and its effects. These are considered the 
most far­reaching measures taken in Norway since the end of the Second World 
War [10, p. 776].
On 14 March, a travel ban was instated for health professionals who work 
directly with patients. Two days later a recommendation was issued that also 
the general public should not travel abroad. Also on 14 March, to implement 
measures limiting the further spread of the coronavirus, the arrival of resettle­
ment refugees (quota refugees) was suspended23. At that time, there were 5,120 
refugees24, who were to be moved to around 200 municipalities in Norway. Ref­
20 COVID­19: Guidance on the implementation of relevant EU provisions in the area of asy­
lum and return procedures and on resettlement, 2020, European Commission, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/guidance-implementation-eu-provisions-asylum-re­
tur­procedures­resettlement.pdf (accessed 25.04.2020); COVID­19 emergency measures in 
asylum and reception systems, 2020, EASO, Bruessels, p. 5, available at: https://www.easo.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/covid19­emergency­measures­asylum­reception­systems.pdf 
(accessed 25.04.2020).
21 COVID­19 emergency measures in asylum and reception systems, 2020, EASO, Bruessels, 
p. 7, available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/covid19­emergency­mea­
sures­asylum­reception­systems.pdf (accessed 25.04.2020); In the following, only those meal­
sures relevant for mobility or migration will be discussed. Other measures will not be discussed 
here, such as the introduction of hygiene regulations, the closure of public facilities such as 
kindergartens, schools, universities and recreational facilities (sports centres, clubs, etc.) and 
the closure of hairdressers, hotels, shopping malls or stores, etc. or the ban on overnight stays 
for people with second homes (mostly vacation homes) in other localities [10, P. 775].




24 More than half of the people to be moved were resettlement refugees (Regjeringen.no, 2020).
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ugees who had been granted a residence permit in Norway and a settlement in a 
municipality, but who were not yet in Norway, were refused entry until further 
notice25. At the same time, temporary entry and exit controls were introduced at 
the Schengen internal border26.
On 15 March, the “Forskrift om bortvisning mv. av utlendinger uten opphold­
stillatelse i riket av hensyn til folkehelsen” (regulation no. 293) came into force27. 
Paragraph 1 of this law, “The Expulsion of Foreigners without a Residence per­
mit, etc.”, stipulates with reference to the Immigration Act that in order to ensure 
public health under COVID­19 conditions, foreigners without a residence per­
mit (including all foreign nationals who were arriving after 16 March, 8 a. m.)28 
should immediately be expelled from Norway or leave of their own accord29. 
From that time onwards, foreigners without a residence permit for Norway were 
refused entry at the borders, in accordance with the Infection Law. Still exclud­
ed from this regulation at that time were foreigners who were already in airport 
transit but had not left the country, those seeking asylum or those with caregiving 
or other important welfare­related duties in Norway30. In addition, procedures for 
making case decisions and presenting grounds for those decisions were simpli­
fied. In urgent cases, it became possible to inform asylum applicants of the deci­
sions concerning their application orally via phone or digitally as long as other 
procedural channels were not available31.
On 16 March, medium term internal border controls were introduced to 
prevent the spread of COVID­19. In the most extreme cases, there were mo­
bility controls and restrictions or even bans within or between municipalities 
or localities.
On 8 April, a medium­term regulation concerning the accommodation of 
asylum seekers in reception centres was issued, which included requirements 
regarding social distancing, quarantines and isolation, as well as rules limit­
ing personal contacts and travel mobility32. In addition, all practices within the 




27 Forskrift om bortvisning mv. av utlendinger uten oppholdstillatelse i riket av hensyn til 





31 ibid, para 5.
32 The first paragraph does not apply to those EEA citizens and their family members who are 
residing or working in Norway pursuant to section 110 of the Norwegian Immigration Act.
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tal communication. As of April, for example, asylum applications were no lon­
ger be submitted during a personal interview, but rather by mail to the police. 
Changes were also made regarding the entry deadlines for residence permits. 
As many asylum seekers were unable to continue their journey to Norway due 
to COVID­19­related travel restrictions in Europe, this was recognised as a jus­
tified reason for an extension of the deadline to enter Norway33. All this had “a 
consequent impact on the processing, renewal and validity of temporary authori­
sation of stay, residence permits and long and short stay visas of third­country 
nationals in (the EU and) Norway”34.
Finally, the ‘Corona Act’ (conceived as a provisional measure) came into 
force at the end of March. Since this made it possible to adapt 62 other basic laws 
or areas of law in the context of COVID­1935, it can also be regarded as a kind of 
enabling act. The resulting “restrictions gave priority to health over the economy 
and  to standardised national  regulations over  local flexibility, and  they were a 
combination of mandatory regulations and more soft advisories.” [10; p. 776].
In July another law came into force, the “Midlertidig lov om innreiserestriks­
joner for utlendinger av hensyn til folkehelsen”36, which was aimed at regulating 
immigration to Norway for the following months. This included the following 
regulations:
«A foreign national is only entitled to enter if
a) the foreign national resides in Norway with a residence permit or right of 
residence under the Immigration Act;
b) the foreign national seeks protection (asylum) in the realm or otherwise in­
vokes a right to international protection due to risk of persecution etc.; see section 
73 of the Immigration Act;
c) the presence of the foreign national in the realm is essential to maintain the 
proper operation of critical public functions or attend to fundamental needs of the 
population;
d) the foreign national has been granted a residence permit without deferred 
entry; see section 3;
33 Beboere i asylmottak etter statsborgerskap og status i søknad, 2020, UDI, available at: 
https://www.udi.no/en/statistics­and­analysis/statistics/beboere­i­asylmottak­etter­statsborg­
erskap­og­status­i­soknad­2020/ (accessed 25.04.2020).
34 Inform № 1 — EU  and OECD member states responses to managing residence permits 
and migrant unemployment during the COVID­19 pandemic, 2020, European  Migration 
Network, European Commission, p. 3, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home­affairs/sites/
homeaffairs/files/oo_eu_inform1_residence_permits_and_unemployment_en_updated_final.
pdf (accessed 25.04.2020).
35 Midlertidig Lov om Forskriftshjemmel for å Avhjelpe Konsekvenser av Utbrudd av Covid­19 
mv. (Koronaloven), 2020, Justis- og Beredskapsdepartment, available at: https://lovdata.no/
dokument/LTI/lov/2020­03­27—17 (accessed 25.04.2020).
36 This is an Interim Act relating to entry restrictions for foreign nationals concerning public 
health (Interim Act Relating to Entry Restrictions for Foreign Nationals out of Concern for 
Public Health, 2020, Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Oslo, available at: https://lovda­
ta.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2020—06—19—83) (accessed 25.04.2020)
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e) the foreign national has been granted an entry visa under section 12 of the 
Immigration Act;
f) the foreign national has been granted a visa under section 10 of the Immigration 
Act by the Norwegian decision­making authority subsequent to 15 March 2020».
Furthermore,  there  is  an optional  provision  that  names  specific  reasons  for 
which a foreign national may nonetheless enter the country, such as care obliga­
tions for a family member or other important welfare­related duties37. Violations 
of this decree are to be punished with non­entry or expulsion.
Regarding the area of mobility and migration, it can be concluded that Nor­
way’s strategic approach with respect to immigration can be described as in­
clusive, even during the implementation of COVID­19 measures [10]. Although 
Norway  intensified  its  border  controls,  established  entry  restrictions  and  even 
closed borders with Sweden  and Germany  (for  example,  ferry  traffic between 
Norway and Germany), asylum seekers (and immigrants in general) continued to 
have access to safety, health­care services and integration­relevant information 
(for example, on the subject of application procedures, communication and con­
tact possibilities, etc.) despite the implementation of pandemic measures.
As Christensen & Lægreid [10] conclude: “The government measures were 
implemented through a joint strategy of advice, guidelines, and mandatory direc­
tives, the last followed up with potential penalties for non­compliance. Although 
the measures were pretty strong, the most draconian measures, such as a full 
shutdown of businesses, a curfew, full border closure and isolation of infected 
citizens in designated buildings, were not imposed.” [10; P.777].
The Case of Asylum Applications in the Context of COVID-19  
and the Implementation of COVID-19-Related Measures
For finding out if the implemented measures somehow had an effect on im­
migration in Norway in the following we will examine the impact the COVID 
policy had on asylum mobility, asylum applications in general and asylum appli­
cations from unaccompanied minors. In particular, we look at the development of 
the number of asylum applications to Norway for the last three years (2018, 2019 
and 2020).38 These numbers are collected and made publicly available by the 
Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI), the main institution responsible 
for processing asylum applications, including those specifically from foreigners 
(mainly Third Country Nationals) who wish to visit or live in Norway. The UDI 
is also responsible for refugee reception centres, refugee housing and deporta­
37 Interim Act Relating to Entry Restrictions for Foreign Nationals out of Concern for Public 
Health, 2020, Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Oslo, available at: https://lovdata.no/
dokument/NLE/lov/2020­06­19­83 (accessed 25.04.2020).
38 Irregular migrants were not included in this analysis.
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tion39. The available data include information on the number of asylum seekers 
in Norway living in housing centres (currently 35 centres, while there were 40 
in 2019) and the number of asylum applications from adults and youths living in 
these asylum centres (fig. 1)40.
The data and respective figures show a general  trend,  that  is, a general de­
crease in numbers over the entire period between 2018 and 2020 as well as falling 
figures in the respective years. In January 2018, for example, 4,885 asylum-seek­
ers were living in these centres, whereas by September 2020 this figure had de­
creased to approximately half of that number, namely 2,626 asylum seekers. Fig. 
1 further indicates that the average number of asylum seekers in reception centres 









Jan Feb Mar Apr Mai Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2018 2019 2020
Fig. 1.Number of Asylum Seekers in Reception Centres 2018, 2019, 2020
Source: Data provided by UDI.
Next, we analyse the development of the number of asylum seekers registered 
at the national arrival centre Råde i Østfold (the only one of its kind in Norway), 
which was established in 2015. It can be assumed that if COVID­19 and the 
measures to deal with it had had an effect on immigration — here specifically, 
asylum-related migration — this should be reflected in a significantly lower num­
ber of asylum seekers, starting in February 2020 and over the following months.
39 Beboere i asylmottak etter statsborgerskap og status i søknad (2020), 2020, The Norwe-
gian Directorate of Immigration, available at: https://www.udi.no/en/statistics­and­analysis/
statistics/beboere­i­asylmottak­etter­statsborgerskap­og­status­i­soknad­2020/ (accessed 
25.04.2020). For an explanation of the different types of asylum seeker reception and housing 
institutions, see Ulike Typer Asylmottak, 2020, The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, 
available at: https://www.udi.no/asylmottak/ulike­typer­asylmottak/ (accessed 25.04.2020).
40 This population is very heterogeneous with reference to their country of origin and specific 
migration motivations. By October, asylum seekers from 37 countries plus so­called stateless 
persons were living in the arrival centers (Beboere i asylmottak etter statsborgerskap og status 
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Fig. 2 Number of Asylum Seekers in Reception Centre Råde  
in Østfold 2018, 2019, 2020
Source: Data provided by UDI.
As Fig. 2 shows, the number of asylum seekers at the arrival centre Råde i Øst­
fold follows a U­curve during this time period. The decrease between February 
and May is significant and does not recover until July and August, with the gradu­
al withdrawal of the drastic COVID­19 measures introduced in the spring — here 
specifically related to travel and entry restrictions. Moreover, the curve for 2020 
shows a more constant trend with less extreme swings, which could also testify 
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Fig. 3 Asylum Applications Lodged in Norway 2018, 2019, 2020 (N)
Source: Data provided by UDI.
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Next, we take a look at the asylum applications registered in Norway over the 
years 2018—2020. A first glance shows that the number of asylum applications 
falls noticeably from February to April, remains at a very low level until June, 
then rises and falls again over September and October. As described above, it 
seems likely that this is related to the temporarily suspended arrival of resettle­
ment refugees (quota refugees) on 14 March41. This concerns refugees who had 
already been granted a  residence permit  for Norway and housing  in a specific 
Norwegian municipality, but who had not yet resided in Norway. These refugees 
were not able to travel to Norway from their places of residence at the time. 
A further complicating factor for all other migrants who intended to seek asy­
lum in Norway was that due to general travel restrictions, travel to Norway was 
only possible under difficult and costly conditions (e. g. flights or transportation 
connections to Norway were extremely complicated and expensive and were of­
ten cancelled). Finally, many migrants also hesitated to continue their journey 
to Norway because of the incalculable risks of facing infection, a quarantine or 
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Fig. 4. Asylum Applications of Unaccompanied Minors Lodged in Norway 2018, 2019, 2020
Source: Data provided by UDI.
Finally, let us take a look at the number of unaccompanied minors who have 
sought asylum in Norway in recent years. First of all, it can be seen that in 2018 
and 2019 the number of asylum seekers in this specific migrant group was higher 




than in 2020. The trend in 2018 and 2019 was that the numbers fell slightly until 
the middle of the year and rose sharply for a short time from August to Septem­
ber. The year 2020 shows a different trend. The number of young unaccompanied 
minors seeking asylum falls from 15 in January to 0 in April and then rises again 
through May, June and July. Then in August, September and October, the numbers 
remain close to the July/August level, settling down at a lower level compared 
to the previous years. November is marked by a significant drop in numbers fol­
lowed by a slight rise in applications in December. Again, the data suggests that 
COVID­19 affected the immigration rates of unaccompanied minors to Norway.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to discuss how the spread of COVID­19 led to 
changes in the institutional constraints on immigration and mobility at the Euro­
pean level in general and in Norway in particular, and what consequences this had 
for immigration to Norway — especially in the case of asylum migration.
We have shown that measures were taken relatively early in Europe — how­
ever with significant variations between the member states regarding extent, con­
tent and timeline of measure implementation — and later in Norway to prevent 
the further spread of COVID­19. At the core of these measures were general 
restrictions on mobility/migration and special measures to reduce close contact 
in the context of migration. It is important to note that these measures were not 
primarily aimed at regulating migration or mobility — that is, they were not pri­
marily migration policy measures — but were first and foremost motivated by 
health and security policy concerns [16].
The respective number curves discussed above must be interpreted in this con­
text. While the developments in 2018 and 2019 (and those of the years before) are 
mainly a consequence of migration and security policy measures, the rise and fall 
in migration in 2020 were primarily a consequence of health and security policy 
measures (related to travel, onward travel or entry bans, reduced opportunities 
for face­to­face interaction, physical or social distancing, quarantine rules, etc.) 
to combat the COVID­19 threat. In the example we have chosen — asylum ap­
plications or claims in Norway in 2020 — the available data show a significant 
drop in the number of applications. This drop can be considered a proxy for a sig­
nificantly reduced number of refugees arriving from February to June as a result 
of the existing COVID­19 measures. These measures, as they were implement­
ed throughout Europe, established drastic barriers to mobility almost overnight, 
leading to a ‘freezing’ of mobility.
From a political science perspective [17; 18] one can assume a radical change 
in the procedural dimension of politics. The way in which the content­related 
dimension of political action (‘policy’) comes about in the process of political 
decision­making has become de­democratized under COVID­19, i. e. the tension 
between consensus and conflict has almost been eliminated — at least in a short 
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term perspective. “We are witnessing the disintegration of daily political routines 
and the glowing red, existential anxiety driving political activity in the face of an 
‘external enemy’, which is creating chaos and fear for life and health.” [19].
As a consequence of the drastic COVID­19­related changes in the established 
institutional migration or mobility arrangements and in the corresponding proce­
dures, migrants were forced almost overnight to adapt their practices to the exist­
ing COVID-19 challenge. “The situation is particularly difficult for movers and 
non­movers as the Corona Virus, the lack of preparation for a pandemic, and the 
unknowns that surround COVID­19 become an existential threat to security.” [8, 
P. 405]. The resulting uncertainties are complex for migrants on multiple levels. 
First, they concern the perception and factual situation of the institutional condi­
tions for migration. The adjustments and changes implemented and in progress 
to meet the challenge of COVID-19 must first be understood, deciphered in the 
context of the new situation and put into practice according to the adjusted insti­
tutional procedures. For migrants, it results in a growing uncertainty regarding 
the amount of information they need to make appropriate decisions regarding 
their own migration situation. Uncertainties also arose as to what the existing 
alternatives for action could be in the context of asylum­related migration and 
corresponding asylum procedures. Finally, this led to uncertainties regarding the 
consequences of action in connection with the new boundary conditions. Which 
actions are most likely to help me reach my goal, which obstacles and risks must 
I reckon with, which institutional rules and procedures apply in the respective 
countries in the context of the COVID-19 threat, etc.? “At points of origin and 
destination, movers and non­movers are confronted by these new insecurities and 
the reality that they may undermine plans going forward.” [8, P. 407]. Should one 
migrate in  times of COVID-19 or should one wait? “This can be as difficult a 
decision as is staying put and practising self­quarantine.” [8, P. 407].
“This extraordinary situation contains a mixture of frantic political measures 
and a social life of the lowest possible intensity.” [19]. Migrants should no longer 
be mobile. Rather, they should follow the political interventions and implemented 
measures, immobilize themselves, so to speak, and distance themselves physical­
ly and socially from one another in immobility. In the context of COVID­19 mo­
bility and migration became more and more perceived as a risk to public health 
at a supranational, national and sub-national level, an accomplice to the “external 
enemy”, a threat to life and health [19].
And yet, the intentions of political regulation in the context of COVID­19 
must not be confused with their effect, since the object for regulation — in our 
case mobility and migration — has its own autonomy with respect to control 
and regulation activities [20; 21]. Accordingly, despite the restrictive COVID­19 
migration policy described, a dynamic contingent migration practice can be as­
sumed. Exactly this aspect of emergence, process and autonomy could be used 
as a starting point for further research to shed light on institutional contexts and 
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forms of practice of actors (corporate agents as well as migrants) in the context of 
a defined pandemic. This would help to better understand the role of contingency 
in the context of restrictive political conditions regarding mobility and migration.
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